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NEGLECTED ALTERNATIVES FOR INVESTOR SELF-HELP: THE




Clearly, the concept of an "implied" private action based upon congres-
sional proscriptions set out in the various federal securities laws is sufficiently
broad in scope to include provisions of the Investment Company Act of 19402
[hereinafter referred to as the Act]. Nevertheless, the provisions of that Act were
not relied upon as a basis for recovery by a shareholder against the management
of a company which had failed to register under its provisions in any reported
case until Esplin v. Hirschi in September, 1968. 4 When it is considered that in
an appropriate case it is a potent tool in stockholder litigation, the delayed entry
of the Investment Company Act into the implied liabilities arena is surprising, for
the comprehensive system of fiduciary obligations imposed by the Investment
Company Act may provide relief to an aggrieved investor which is more effective
and more simplified than that available under the more familiar anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.' To date, the private litigation that has arisen under the Investment Com-
pany Act has been concerned almost exclusively with the failure of licensed
mutual funds t6 comply with the regulatory provisions of the Act dealing with
management contracts.' Many factors, including the complex nature of the
Act itself, the attendant difficulty in the mastery of its provisions, and the evident
reluctance of management to hazard a judicial test when its conduct has been
challenged,8 have contributed to the absence of any extensive private litigation
of the provisions of the Act, particularly with reference to unregistered companies.
This article is devoted to an analysis of such possible implied actions as an aspect
of the regulation of investment companies.
Such an action might take many different forms. The possibilities are at
least as numerous as the fiduciary duties imposed by the Act,' and as varied
* Member, State Bar of Utah, Federal Bar Association; B.S.L., University of Utah, 1957;
LL.B., University of Utah College of Law, 1959; practicing attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah.
1 See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and the
multitude of cases following the so-called "Kardon Doctrine."
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1964). For a brief sketch of the background and
legislative history of the Act, see Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
3 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. April 1, 1969)
(No. 1013). The author was counsel in Hirschi in the trial court as well as on appeal.
4 But see note 8 infra. See also Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
where a motion to dismiss such a claim was denied.
5 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964) and Rule 10b-5
adopted pursuant thereto, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
7 E.g., Brown v. Bullock,,294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
8 Actions have been initiated which apparently would have determined many of the
questions posed in this article, but they have either not been tried or their determination has
not found its way into legal literature. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 55, 61 and 85 infra.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (1964), reproduced in full at note 59 infra, which defines
fiduciary duties as they pertain to unregistered investment companies.
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as the resourcefulness of the lawyer who undertakes to employ the Act in his
quest for the relief of an aggrieved stockholder. A catalogue of these possibilities
is, of course, impossible, particularly in the absence of any extensive litigation
of the provisions of the Act. However, some definite points of departure will be
examined.
Moreover, the availability of an implied cause of action against the un-
registered investment company is neither a matter of limited concern, nor is it
of interest only as a possibility for stockholder litigation. Indeed, the currency
of such unregistered companies is far greater than might be supposed. Those
engaged in counseling the corporate community should be alert to recognize
the type of company which the Act purports to regulate and careful to arrange
its affairs so that the objects of the regulatory scheme are satisfied. Otherwise,
the penalties which might follow the disregard of these important provisions
are considerable.
I. The Scope of the Problem
Although the type of investment company under consideration may result
from a calculated disregard of the registration requirements of the Investment
Company Act by a corporation subject to its provisions, the failure to register
may also be a result of simple ignorance of the provisions of the law - what
has been aptly described as the "inadvertent investment company."" The pro-
moters or management of such a company may have never intended to create
an "investment company" at all, and may even claim that they are engaged
to some degree in other business pursuits; yet by reason of the accumulation of
an investment portfolio, the company may nevertheless fall within the Act's
definition of an "investment company."" The definition, in practical effect,
declares that a company will be deemed to be an "investment company" if (1)
it says that it is, or (2) if it is in fact engaged primarily in the investment com-
pany business" and is not otherwise exempt."1
10 See Kerr, The Inadvertent Investment Company: Section 3 (a) (3) of the Investment
Company Act, 12 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1959). See also SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc.,
289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964) provides:
When used in this subchapter, "investment company" means any issuer which-
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) [Part (2) refers to "face-amount" certificate companies, which are
not discussed because they are rarely encountered.]
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, rein-
vesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items)
on an unconsolidated basis.
12 See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency,
76th Cong., 3rd Sess., pt. 1, at 176-77 (1940). This is, of course, an oversimplification of a
complex definition, the detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this article. It should
be noted, however, that the first part of the definition, quoted in note 11 supra, refers to
transactions of companies primarily engaged in investing in securities, while the latter part of
the definition does not employ the term "primarily" but substitutes a somewhat arbitrary
standard for determining when a company is actually engaged in the investment company
business, i.e., if its investment securities represent forty per cent of its total assets exclusive of
cash and government securities. "Investment securities" are defined in note 16 infra. The
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Any company falling within the first part of the definition would, pre-
sumably, recognize its status and comply with the regulatory scheme.14 If it did
not do so, action in the courts against management by its shareholders should be
expected, either to recover any damages they may have suffered or to require
compliance with the fiduciary standards imposed by the Act for their benefit.
The second portion of the definition may form a snare for the unwary.
Under it a company will be deemed to be "engaged" in the investment company
business if its liquid assets, 5 which are defined by the term "investment securi-
ties,"'" equal forty per cent of its total assets other than government securities
and cash, and for the purpose of this criterion an entirely static portfolio will
satisfy the requirements of the definition.' Considering the wide variety of in-
vestments which may be classified as a "security,"' it is dear that this "statis-
tical" forty per cent formula could be met by a great many unsuspecting
business enterprises.
distinction between "securities" and "investment securities" must be kept in mind, since, for
example, it would seem that a company which -holds itself out as being engaged primarily in
securities transactions is an investment company even if its portfolio consists of securities
which would be exempt under the latter part of the definition, as, for example, if it trades
in "government securities," while a company claiming to be engaged primarily in industrial
ventures other than investments will become an "inadvertent" investment company only if
its "investment securities" reach such a level that regulation is required according to the
standards of the Act. For a more complete discussion of these matters, together with other
subtleties involved in the definition, and the complex exemptions and exclusions of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-3(b), (c), and § 80a-6 (1964), see Kerr, supra note 10; Garrett, When is an Invest-
ment Company?, 37 U. DEr. L.J. 355 (1960).
13 For exceptions and exemptions under the Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c), 80a-6
(1964). They are numerous and complex, and their discussion is beyond the scope of this
article. See also Garrett, supra note 12, at 359-61. Cf. Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213,
246 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the Act is to be strictly construed against a claim of exemption).
14 But see SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where
the court concluded that, even under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (a) (1) (1964), a company could be-
come an investment company inadvertently because "[ijt would seem to be possible for a
company to find itself at a given point in time to be actually engaged primarily in this business,
even though it originally did not intend to be so engaged." Id. at 27-28. (Emphasis added.)
15 The Tonopah Mining Co. of Nevada, 26 S.E.C. 426 (1947). See text accompanying
note 26 infra. See also Kerr, supra note 10.
16 "Investment securities" are defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964) as follows:
As used in this section, "investment securities" includes all securities except (A)
Government securities, (B) securities issued by employees' securities companies, and
(C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of the owner which are not
investment companies.
17 The Atlantic Coast Line Co. 11 S.E.C. 661, 663-64 (1942); Kerr, supra note 10, at
34. It is important to note that the section 3(a) (3) definition refers to "owning" of "securi-
ties." Thus it is not necessary for the company to actively trade in its portfolio if the other
conditions of the definition are met. But see SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 3, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court declared that the term "''[b]usiness' implies
continued activity."
18 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (savings and loan passbook),
court of appeals decision commented on in 43 NOTRE DAasa LAWrYER 124 (1967); SEC v.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (interests in oil properties); Continental Market-
ing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (con-
tracts for sale and management of live beavers).
19 The section 3(a) (3) definition was originally characterized as a "statistical" formula
by counsel for the SEC in hearings on a preliminary draft of the Act:
Paragraph 2 of section 3 (a) [which is identical with section 3(a) (3) as enacted]
sets forth what we call a statistical formula which will be of assistance in determining
whether a company is an investment company or is not an investment company...
Our approach is that an investment company, for the purpose of this proposed
legislation, is a company which is engaged in the business of investing and reinvesting
in securities, or is a company which invests and reinvests or holds securities of other
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It is also important to consider provisions of the Act which declare that
an investment company cannot cease to be an investment company without
obtaining SEC approval,2" for it has been urged that an unregistered company
is subject to that limitation to the same extent as a registered company. 1 If
the unregistered company is so subject, which seems to be the case based upon a
plain reading of the Act,2 2 it would follow that even an occasional transgression
of the forty per cent barrier established by the second part of the definition will
render a company subject to all of the provisions of the Act;22 and the attendant
exposure to civil liability might continue until it has been determined, pursuant
to proper application with the SEC, that the public interest no longer requires
regulation. Such an interpretation has been advanced by the SEC in its enforce-
ment actions under the Act.24 If such a construction is proper in the context of
a request by the SEC for injunctive relief, it would appear equally proper, and
perhaps even mandatory, when one of the investors the Act was designed to
protect claims to have been injured by such an occasional transgression.
This brief discussion of the section 3 (a) definition of an "investment com-
pany" should suffice to indicate the broad scope of the Act. Indeed, it should
be immediately apparent that a great many corporations, perhaps even some
which are substantial, well established, and otherwise managed by prominent
and responsible members of the business community, will fall within the broad
sweep of the statistical definition of section 3(a) (3). Banks, insurance com-
panies, finance companies, employees' stock bonus, pension or profit sharing
trusts and even the small investment clubs which exist in large numbers through-
out the country are among the companies plainly within the scope of the defini-
tion. However, these businesses, along with many other businesses which are by
definition within those provisions, are exempt under the manifold exemptions
and exclusions of sections 3 (c) and 6.25 Generally, these exempt businesses are
companies which were thought to be effectively regulated by other provisions of
state or federal law. There are many others which are not exempt, including
those which are organized with the avowed purpose of functioning in a fashion
"similar" to that of the companies exempted by sections 3 (c) and 6, either as
part of a scheme to avoid the regulatory pattern or in total oblivion of the pro-
visions of the Act. Not the least important, for these purposes, is the company
which is organized as an industrial enterprise but later evolves into a corporation
fitting the section 3 (a) (3) definition. These corporations, organized or existing
corporations, provided that at least 40 percent of its assets consists of marketable
diversified securities. Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 12, at 176-77.
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1(b) (6), 80a-8(f) (1964).
21 SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 746 (2d Cir. 1966).
22 See authorities cited in notes 20 and 21 supra. See also note 63 infra, for authorities
holding that securities laws are to be interpreted strictly against any claim of exemption.
23 But see SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where
it was held that "a company is entitled to a reasonable time within which to turn around, so
to speak, to make up its mind what business it will henceforth engage in." Id. at 31. Yet, in
another connection, the same court held that "[tlhe statute does not recognize an exception
for the business that defendants claim Fifth is and was engaged in, i.e., the business of acquir-
ing control of other companies." Id. at 30. Since the defendant was found to be an investment
company, it is doubtful if the case represents a limitation of the position taken in the text.
24 See SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966).
25 See note 13 supra.
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without the benefit of specific exemption, may be subject to the implied private
action advanced in this article.
An example of such an inadvertent company was the Tonopah Mining
Company of Nevada. Although originally organized as a conventional mining
company, Tonopah had acquired a large portfolio of securities which it charac-
terized as its "exploration fund." It actually operated mining properties, both
directly and through majority owned subsidiaries, but over a period of time
its subsidiaries had become largely inactive and its operation of all but one mine
had been discontinued. Tonopah's investment portfolio, consisting in large part
of mining securities, increased in importance as its mining activities decreased;
by the time of the hearing,2" these securities comprised ninety-four per cent of its
total assets and were the source of most of its income. Under these circum-
stances the SEC determined that the company's mining operations had become
incidental to its investment activities and, therefore, required Tonopah to
register as an investment company.27
In the case of an inadvertent investment company, exemplified 2 by Tonopah,
the granting of an implied private cause of action to any shareholder claiming
to be injured, based upon the proscriptions set out in the Act, is reasonable and
necessary if the Act is to achieve its intended result. Moreover, the determination
of such a claim should, insofar as possible, guarantee that when the funds of
a public corporation are employed in an investment program (investments, it
should be observed, which the shareholder might as easily engage in himself if
he so desires), it is only within the framework of the careful regulatory system
that Congress has established. It is submitted, further, that the paramount objec-
tive of investor protection which is evident in the adoption of this legislation
makes it imperative that the stockholder be given his remedy in those situations
where violations of the Act have caused him injury, even in the face of circum-
26 The Tonopah Mining Co. of Nevada, 26 S.E.C. 426 (194-7).
27 The case established five non-exclusive considerations for determining when a company
is "primarily" engaged in the investment company business:
(a) Historical development.
(b) Representations of policy.
(c) Activities of officers and directors.
(d) Nature of assets.
(e) Sources of income. Id. at 427-32.
28 It is not difficult to imagine situations even more startling than the Tonopah case. For
example, since the section 3(a) (3) definition refers to "investment securities" in relation to
the forty per cent criterion, and since "Government securities and cash items" are excluded in
computing the company's total assets, it is evident that the definition of an "inadvertent in-
vestment company" could be satisfied with "investment securities" totalling far less than 40
per cent of the company's total assets. Further, since stock of a subsidiary or affiliated cor-
poration is an "investment security" if the issuer in question does not also hold majority
control [i.e., voting control, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(23) (1964)], cases could be imagined in
which ownership of stock in one or several affiliated corporations, as to which the issuer is the
dominant but not controlling shareholder, would render a company subject to the Act even
though the securities in question are a small part of the company's total assets - especially
if it also had large holdings of cash or government securities. However, see the provisions of
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c) (8) (1964) relating to companies whose "investment securities" are
concentrated, to the extent of ninety per cent, in securities of "a single issuer" of certain
specified types. These provisions are of uncertain meaning, and would have been deleted
entirely in the legislation proposed to Congress in 1967 by the SEC. See S. 1659 and H.R.
9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). In the absence of a ruling as to the company's status
pursuant to an application under sections 3 (b) (2) or 6(d), reliance upon the provisions would
appear foolhardy.
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stances indicating that the violations were inadvertent and unintentional.
Congress has determined in this Act that, to cite but a few examples, undue
concentration through inequitable methods of control," pyramiding, 0 and the
operation of investment companies in the interest of other persons or
corporations3 are against public policy. Even assuming the bona fides of manage-
ment, the investors in a company which violates these proscriptions are as much
imposed upon by the carelessness of management as in those cases where the
violations are intentional. Furthermore, since Congress has declared that a high
degree of trust and responsibility is essential in the investment company industry,32
the failure of management to even apprise itself of the existence of the regulatory
provisions of the Act would seem to indicate an absence of that degree of respon-
sibility, and perhaps even more so when the failure is the result of carelessness.
One of the dominant factors which motivated Congress to adopt the Act
was the temptation presented by a large accumulation of liquid assets to employ
them for the personal gain of those individuals managing or controlling an
investment company."3 That temptation may find expression in relatively subtle
ways, such as in causing the company to invest its funds in corporations or busi-
ness ventures in which management is personally interested. 4 Management may,
in good faith, believe that such investments are sound and beneficial to the
shareholders, and the related enterprise may be otherwise conducted on a high
plane of business ethics. Nevertheless, following an extensive study of the problem
Congress has determined that such transactions are unlawful and contrary to the
public interest. In the interest of the shareholder, these and the many other
standards imposed by the Act " should be rigidly enforced without regard for
the motive or lack of motive of management in any particular alleged violation
of the Act.
In other connections it has been held that a good motive is entirely irrel-
evant when the courts are engaged in enforcing the securities laws, and "[t]he fact
29 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (4) (1964).
30 Id.
31 Id. § 80a-1(b) (2) (1964).
32 Id. § 80a-l(b)'(4) (1964).
33 This is implicit in id. § 80a-l(b) (2) (1964). See also SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court observed:
[T]he legislative history shows that the purpose of the Investment Company Act
was to prevent abuses which may grow out of the unregulated power of management
to use large pools of cash....
. Employing a company's cash to acquire control of other companies, thereby
gaining access to their cash which, in turn, can be used to acquire still more com-
panies, was one of the activities which the Act was intended to regulate. Id. at 30.
34 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2) (1964). See also S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.
6 (1940):
Basically, the problems flow from the very nature of the assets of investment
companies. The assets of such companies invariably consist of cash and securities,
assets which are completely liquid, mobile and readily negotiable. Because of these
characteristics, control of such funds offers manifold opportunities for exploitation by
the unscrupulous managements of some companies. These assets can and have been
easily misappropriated and diverted by such types of managements, and have been
employed to foster their personal interests rather than the interests of public security
holders. It is obvious that in the absence of regulatory legislation, individuals who
lack integrity will continue to be attracted by the opportunities for personal profit
available in the control of the liquid assets of investment companies and that deficien-
cies which have occurred in the past will continue to occur in the future.
35 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l (b) (1964). See also Greene, Fiduciary Standards of
Conduct under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. RPv. 266 (1959).
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that the defendant was disinterested, that he had the best of motives, and that he
thought he was doing the plaintiff a kindness, will not absolve him from liabil-
ity .... "36 The inclusion of a definition of the "inadvertent" investment com-
pany in the Investment Company Act appears to be a declaration by Congress
that it intended the Act to be construed and applied without regard for the
motive behind any particular violation. That intent should be implemented.
For those who find themselves in a questionable status under the section
3 (a) (3) definition, Congress has provided ample measures, within the standards
of responsibility which the Act imposes, to clarify the situation without exposure
to litigation. The company may request a determination of its status as an
investment company under section 3(b) (2)IT or, if there is a question as to
the desirability of regulation in any particular situation, an interpretive ruling
or exemption may be requested under either section 3(b) (2)3 s or section 6(c)
or (d)." If the company is not enagged primarily in the investment company
business it may also rely - at its peril - on the self-executing exemption of
section 3 (b) (1) " which simply declares that such a company is not an "invest-
ment company" despite the other provisions of the Act.
However, the inadvertent investment company is not the exclusive, or even
the primary, company which may be subject to the liabilities under discussion.
Encompassed within the scope of the Act is the more obvious case of the pro-
moter who acts in disregard of its provisions or attempts to avoid the regulatory
scheme by devices which may be more semantic than real.41 Included in this
category are many of the so-called "wheels-of-fortune" that may take the form
of either a corporation or a trust,42 wherein the public is asked to commit hard
won earnings to the care and custody of those who consider themselves possessed
of peculiar business acumen. Such feigned self-esteem may, in many cases, be
but a thin veil for the irresponsible practices Congress sought to eliminate in the
adoption of the Act. As to such practices, greater vigilance in private enforce-
ment, such as suggested by this article, would be a useful tonic.
II. Fundamental Elements
The availability and limit of possible stockholder relief against a company
falling within the definition of section 3(a), but which fails to register under the
Act, is reposed in sections 1 (b) and 7.43 These contain the primary provisions of
36 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 n.39 (1961), quoting
from PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 538 (2d ed. 1955). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), petitions for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1969)
(No. 897), 37 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1969) (No. 937), commented on in 44 Nom
DAME LAWYER 252 (1968).
37 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1964).
38 Id.
39 Id. §§ 80a-6(c), (d) (1964). See also In the Matter of the Trust Fund Sponsored by
the Scholarship Club, Inc., Investment Co. Act Release No. 5524 (Oct. 25, 1968); In" re
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 39 S.E.C. 680 (1960); The Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 11 S.E.C. 661 (1942).
40 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1) (1964).
41 Cf. In re Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 39 S.E.C. 680, 704 (1960).
42 The definition of an investment company in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964) refers to an
"issuer," which has been held to comprehend actual or constructive trusts as well as corpora-
tions. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1(b), 80a-7 (1964).
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the Act which affect the operations of such a company. While most of the Act's
other provisions axe specifically limited to "registered" investment companies, it
would be unwise to assume that the obligations they impose upon registered
companies are not applicable with equal force to unregistered companies. In
any event, it will be seen that essentially the same standards are imposed upon
the unregistered company by virtue of the provisions of section 1 (b). More-
over, the consequences of a failure to comply with section 7 may be determinative
of a claim by the investor, and render reference to the fiduciary duties un-
necessary. Also, it must be kept in mind that it is not just the company which
may be subject to liability in such a failure to register, for management and pro-
moters are also within the proscriptions of section 7.
A. Jurisdiction
Although some have urged that the courts should not entertain claims by
private parties under the Investment Company Act because a private cause of
action was not expressly created by Congress,44 the development of the concept
of implied liabilities is by now so well established that there appears to be little
room for doubt that such actions are available under the Investment Company
Act.4" Section 44 of the Investment Company Act,46 like corresponding section 27
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 grants federal courts jurisdiction to en-
tertain all actions brought "to enforce any liability or duty created by" the
statute or to "enjoin any violation of" its provisions, and, since they appear to
go beyond the mere authorization of enforcement action by the SEC, these
clauses have been found sufficient to imply a civil remedy.48 However, an even
more compelling reason for concluding that the Act was designed to accommo-
date a private cause of action is the fact that section 44 also contains a grant of
concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to enforce liabilities under or enjoin viola-
tions of the Act. Since other sections of the Act which authorize suit by the
44 See Shipley, The SEC's Amicus Curiae Aid to Plaintiffs in Mutual Fund Litigation, 52
A.B.A.J. 337 (1966), where an effort was made to discredit the concept of implied liabilities
under the Investment Company Act with heavy emphasis being placed on Brouk v. Managed
Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962). The Brouk
case, standing alone in its rejection of implied liabilities among all decided cases, was dis-
avowed by the very court which authored it in Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d
783 (8th Cir. 1967):
The Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak . . . emphatically endorsed implied
private civil remedies for violation of § 14(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act. In so doing
the Court . . . stated: "It is for the federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as
to grant the necessary relief' where federally secured rights are invaded." In coming
down strongly in favor of courts implying private civil remedies where none are ex-
pressed, the strong indications are, that if given the opportunity, the Supreme Court
would also find an implied civil liability in the Investment Company Act and thereby
overrule our opinion in Brouk. Id. at 793.
The Shipley article was expertly refuted in Loomis & Eisenberg, The SEC as Amicus Curia
in Shareholder Litigation - A Reply, 52 A.B.A.J. 749 (1966).
45 See note 44 supra. For an excellent discussion of the development of such liabilities
under section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), and Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968), see Dykstra, Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5, 1967
UTAH L. REv. 207.
46 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1964).
47 Id. § 78aa (1964).
48 See 3 L. Loss, SEcURITI s REGULATION 2006 (2d ed. 1961).
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SEC for injunctive relief 9 refer only to actions brought in the federal courts, it
is evident that the grant of concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts must
contemplate private actions.50 "
It was, therefore, both logical and predictable that when the question of
jurisdiction over a claim of implied civil liability arose under the Investment
Company Act, the courts would resolve the issue in favor of such a private right.
There are, by now, quite a number of such cases which have arisen in various
contexts,"' and the courts Which have considered the question are unanimous
in finding such an implied private cause of action. 2
The largest number of cases, and those constituting the most significant
authority, which have held that a private cause of action may be maintained
under section 44 of the Investment Company Act have involved companies
that were registered under the Act. They are, nevertheless, important precedents
to the type of action under consideration. If a private action is available to enforce
the provisions of the Act dealing with registered companies, such an action should
be equally available to enforce those portions of the Act dealing with unregistered
companies.
B. Fiduciary Duties Under Section 1 (b)
The Investment Company Act is composed of a detailed and comprehensive
system of regulatory provisions touching almost every phase of the operation of
those companies subject to its coverage. In fact, the Act has been held to con-
stitute a federal corporate law for investment companies.5 3 As we have already
observed, however, practically all of these specific mandates of the Act are di-
rected, by their terms, to "registered" companies, thus at least raising the ques-
tion of whether relief could be granted in favor of a shareholder against an
49 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
50 See Loomis & Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 750, where the authors explain that:
Section 44 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 contains a grant of jurisdic-
tion in identical words [with section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934],
differing only in that state courts are granted concurrent jurisdiction over suits to
enforce any liability or duty created by the Investment Company Act. Since there
can be only two types of civil actions under the statute, commission enforcement
actions and suits by private parties, and since under the provisions of Section 36 and
Section 42 of the act, commission enforcement actions must be brought in the federal
courts, the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts can apply only to private
actions. To that extent, the provisions of the Investment Company Act provide a
greater basis for private actions than does Section 27 of the Securities Act. (Foot-
note omitted.)
See also Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial
Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 181 (1966).
51 E.g., Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). For a thorough review of Brown
and other cases see Loomis & Eisenberg, supra note 44, and Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 50.
52 Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), the only case holding
that such liabilities do not exist, was reversed by implication in Greater Iowa Corp. v. Mc-
Lendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967), discussed at note 44 supra.
53 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
See also Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 '(1946);
Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957).
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unregistered company for failure to observe the requirements of the Act.55
The SEC has frequently circumvented this problem by obtaining an injunction
requiring registration," after which all provisions of the Act would obviously
apply; but the injunction approach would probably be unsuitable and pro-
hibitively costly to a private party - if available at all."'
In fact, there is no reason to suppose that all of the proscriptions of the Act,
including those specifically directed only to "registered" companies, do not apply
with equal force to companies which fail to register.5" The provisions of section
l(b),s with its enumeration of the abuses Congress sought to eliminate in the
54 Cf. SEC v. Wong, 254 F. Supp. 66 (D.C.P.R. 1966) and SEC v. Wong, 42 F.R.D.
599 (D.C.P.R. 1967), both of which involve the same case. In the latter decision it was held
that a private party could assert a claim for relief against a registered company under the pro-
visions of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964), dealing with injunctions against gross abuse of trust,
even though the section mentions only the Commission in its grant of such a remedy. The
court, nevertheless, held that such a right could be implied. (Contra, Cogan v. Johnston, 162
F. Supp. 907, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see note 57 infra.) In the first opinion, the court dis-
posed of defenses based upon the fact that the defendant had resigned his position as an officer
of the fund, and hence was not an officer of "any registered investment company" as the section
seems to require, with the following observation:
We can not charge Congress with an absurdity. . . . Obviously, the fact that the
co-defendant was not employed as an officer or director of a registered investment
company when this suit was instituted is immaterial to a decision on whether, because
of his alleged past violations, an injunction should issue under Section 36. Surely
Congress could not have meant to set up an important protection against gross abuse
of trust on the one hand and vitiate its effect by providing such an easy route of escape
on the other. SEC v. Wong, 254 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.C.P.R. 1966).
It would seem that the same reasoning should apply to any claim that the entire range
of fiduciary duties under the Act does not apply to the unregistered company.
55 See Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where, in an action by a
shareholder against an unregistered investment company, the court denied a motion to dismiss
and held that jurisdiction was properly invoked under section 44 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-43 (1964), "which grants to the district court jurisdiction of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of, the
Act .... " Id. at 909.
56 E.g., SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
57 It is at least arguable that the rights of a private party in an injunction action under
the Act are more limited than when the plaintiff is the SEC, which is granted specific author-
ity to seek injunctive relief against "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust." See Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964), which authorizes the SEC to bring
suit for injunctive relief against gross misconduct and abuse of trust under the Act. Presum-
ably a private party could also seek such relief, subject to the usual requirements of a suit in
equity. Contra, Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the court sus-
tained a cause of action under section 44 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1964), but went on
to state:
The second cause of action is also specifically predicated upon jurisdiction under
Section 36. The plain language of that section authorizes the Commission to bring
an action against an individual based upon gross abuse of trust in respect of any
registered investment company for which such person serves as an officer or director.
Whatever relief the plaintiff may be entitled to, he may not, as an individual, sue
under this section on the basis of alleged abuse of trust by an officer or director of an
unregistered investment company, to enjoin the officer or director from holding his
office. Id. at 909.
58 Cf. Kerr, supra note 10, at 36, together with authorities referred to therein, where it is
concluded that the limitation of the definition of "value" of the assets of "registered" com-
panies contained in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (39) (1964) is equally applicable to unregistered
companies.
59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1964), provides:
(b) Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and reports of the Securities
and Exchange Commission made pursuant to section 79z-4 of this title, and facts
otherwise disclosed and ascertained, it is declared that the national public interest
and the interest of investors are adversely affected-
(1) when the investors purchase, pay for, exchange, receive dividends upon,
vote, refrain from voting, sell, or surrender securities issued by investment com-
panies without adequate, accurate, and explicit information, fairly presented,
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adoption of the Act, appear to constitute a comprehensive mandate which covers
all of the subsequent statutory prohibitions. A careful examination of the Act
reveals that each of the detailed proscriptions contained in its other sections has
an abbreviated counterpart in section I (b), and that each is but an implementa-
tion of the fiduciary standards which the Act imposes in section I (b).60 When
the Act is so considered - and it is submitted that this is the only construction
which gives meaning to the obvious purpose of eliminating investment companies
that do not adhere to the high standards of conduct which Congress determined
to impose-the limitation of the subsequent sections to "registered" companies is
rendered purely academic."' The application of section 1(b) is not limited to
companies which are registered under the Act. It speaks, rather, of "investment
companies," which are defined in section 3 (a), and the definition patently is not
limited simply to companies which register under the Act.
In addition to the logic of this suggested reading of section 1(b), there is
additional support for it in both the statute and in the case law. There is a
specific mandate in the last sentence of section 1 (b) that the Act "shall be
interpreted . . . so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in
this section" and it is also declared that "the policy and purposes" of the Act
are to be interpreted with reference to section 1 (b). Thus, it appears dear that
concerning the character of such securities and the circumstances, policies, and
financial responsibility of such companies and their management;
(2) when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or
their portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors, officers, invest-
ment advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons thereof, in the interest of
underwriters, brokers, or dealers, in the interest of special classes of their security
holders, or in the interest of other investment companies or persons engaged in
other lines of business, rather than in the interest of all classes of such com-
panies' security holders;
(3) when the investment companies issue securities containing inequitable
or discriminatory provisions, or fail to r rotect the preferences and privileges of
the holders of their outstanding securities;
(4) when the control of investment companies is unduly concentrated
through pyramiding or inequitable methods of control, or is inequitably distrib-
uted, or when investment companies are managed by irresponsible persons;
(5) when investment companies, in keeping their accounts, in maintaining
reserves, and in computing their earnings and the asset value of their outstand-
ing securities, employ unsound or misleading methods, or are not subjected to
adequate independent scrutiny;
(6) when investment companies are reorganized, become inactive, or change
the character of their business, or when the control or management thereof is
transferred, without the consent of their security holders;
(7) when investment companies by excessive borrowing and the issuance
of excessive amounts of senior securities increase unduly the speculative character
of their junior securities; or
(8) when investment companies operate without adequate assets or reserves.
It is declared that the policy and purpose of this subchapter, in accordance with
which the provisions of this subchapter shall be interpreted, are to mitigate and, so far
as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in this section which adversely
affect the national public interest and the interest of investors.
60 "§ 1 (b) of the Act . . . in effect codifies the fiduciary obligations placed upon officers
and directors of investment companies." Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 354, 260 (1st
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the
Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258 (1961); Greene, supra note 35.
61 Cf. SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968), where the court
applied the prohibitions of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a) (1964) to a company which was unregistered
at the time the suit was commenced, but had subsequently registered to satisfy the demands
of the SEC. Id. at 614. The court did not discuss the distinction between registered and un-
registered companies.
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Congress, at least, considered that the various sections would be construed with
reference to one another and that it was imposing the same standards upon all
investment companies-not just those which subsequently registered. Moreover,
the courts have alluded to the last sentence of section 1 (b) and held that it
constitutes a direction to the courts with respect to the interpretation of the Act.
62
Finally, in other connections it has been held that a technical reading of the
statute may not be indulged in to frustrate its purposes."
C. Failure to Register and Section 7
A more direct and obvious approach to the liabilities of an unregistered
investment company and its management is available under the provisions of
section 7.64 There is no doubt that section 7, which requires registration pursuant
62 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961) (breach of section 1(b) will result
in penalties).
63 Cf. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 405 F.2d
421 (2d Cir. 1968). See also SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968);
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the Act is to be given a liberal construc-
tion to accomplish its remedial purposes).
64 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1964) declares:
(a) No investment company organized or otherwise created under the laws of
the United States or of a State and having a board of directors, unless registered
under section 80a-8 of this title, shall directly or indirectly-
(1) offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale, by the use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, any security or any interest in a security,
whether the issuer of such security is such investment company or another person;
or offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale any such security or interest, having reason
to believe that such security or interest will be made the subject of a public offering
by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce;
(2) purchase, redeem, retire, or otherwise acquire or attempt to acquire, by
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, any security
or any interest in a security, whether the issuer of such security is such investment
company or another person;
(3) control any investment company which does any of the acts enumerated in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection;
(4) engage in any business in interstate commerce; or
(5) control any company which is engaged in any business in interstate com-
merce.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to transactions of an investment
company which are merely incidental to its dissolution.
(b) No depositor or trustee of or underwriter for any investment company,
organized or otherwise created under the laws of the United States or of a State
and not having a board of directors, unless such company is registered under section
80a-8 of this title or exempt under section 80a--6 of this title, shall directly or
indirectly-
(1) offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, any security or any interest in a security
of which such company is the issuer; or offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale any
such security or interest, having reason to believe that such security or interest will
be made the subject of a public offering by use of the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce;
'(2) purchase, redeem, or otherwise acquire or attempt to acquire, by use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, any security or any
interest in a security of which such company is the issuer; or
(3) sell or purchase for the account of such company, by use of the mails or
by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, any security or interest in a
security, by whomever issued.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to transactions which are merely
incidental to the dissolution of an investment company.
(c) No promoter of a proposed investment company, and no underwriter for
such a promoter, shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce, directly or indirectly, to offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale,
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to section 8,65 applies to any company falling within the definition of section
3 (a) ." Section 7 simply declares that a company which does not so register shall
not engage in certain activities, the scope of which are sufficiently broad to
encompass almost any activity of an unregistered investment company, including
even engaging in any business in interstate commerce." The activities of promot-
ers and underwriterss are also included in the proscriptions of section 7. Thus,
in many cases in which a shareholder is aggrieved under circumstances where an
investment company has failed to register under the Act, it is possible to take
direct action under the provisions of section 7 against either the company or its
principals, or both."
In any action against an unregistered investment company by an aggrieved
stockholder, one of the most important provisions contained in section 7 is the
familiar prohibition, included in most securities legislation, that it is unlawful
for a company or any other person subject to the Act to sell securities without
complying with the registration requirements. While this proposition may appear
obvious, it is nevertheless of fundamental importance when considered in con-
junction with the voidability provisions."
As we shall see, the voidability provisions of the Investment Company Act
apply to the stock sales agreement along with any other business transactions of
an unregistered company. The importance of the application of the voidability
provisions to the sales contract is found in the incredible simplicity of the remedy
for the aggrieved stockholder; for in view of this blanket prohibition against the
sale of any stock without registration, the trier of fact in any action based upon
section 7 need only address itself to the single question of whether the company
was in fact an "investment company"" within the meaning of the Act. If the
answer to that inquiry is in the affirmative, liability-at least under the voidability
concept-would seem to be established without the need of considering matters
such as causation, reliance, scienter or the other vestiges of common law fraud
in connection with a public offering, any preorganization certificate or subscription for
such a company.
(d) No investment company, unless organized or otherwise created under the
laws of the United States or of a State, and no depositor or trustee of or under-
writer for such a company not so organized or created, shall make use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly, to offer
for sale, sell, or deliver after sale, in connection with a public offering, any security
of which such company is the issuer. Notwithstanding the provisions of this sub-
section and of section 80a-8(a) of this title, the Commission is authorized, upon
application by an investment company organized or otherwise created under the laws
of a foreign country, to issue a conditional or unconditional order permitting such
company to register under this subchapter, and to make a public offering of its
securities by use of the mails and means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
if the Commission finds that, by reason of special circumstances or arrangements, it is
both legally and practically feasible effectively'to enforce the provisions of this sub-
chapter against such company and that the issuance of such order is otherwise con-
sistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.
65 Id. § 80a-8 (1964).
66 Id. § 80a-3(a) (1964).
67 Id. § 80a-7(a)'(4) (1964).
68 Id. §§ 80a-7(b), (c), (d) (1964).
69 See Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Cf. Townsend Corp. of
America v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1963).
70 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 47, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (1964).
71 There may be subsidiary questions, such as who are controlling persons within the mean-
ing of section 48, 15 U.S.C. §80a-47 (1964), but they do not involve the basic liability concept.
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which are frequently injected into actions under the anti-fraud provisions 2 of
other securities laws. Thus, a major battleground in the development of implied
liabilities 3 might be avoided entirely where Investment Company Act violations
are found to occur.
It is incorrect, however, to assume that once a violation of section 7 is
established, reference to section 1 (b) will therefore be unnecessary, for there
may be circumstances in which the shareholder may be anxious to correct
practices declared unfair by section 1 (b). Since registration is the function and
responsibility of management, and not a responsibility of the shareholder that
could limit his rights if the registration requirement is not complied with, "4 an
aggrieved shareholder may well prefer to ignore section 7 and proceed directly
against management on the ground that there has been a breach of fiduciary
obligations under section 1 (b). Finally, if a causal relationship is necessary in a
damage action based upon a failure to register under section 7," such a causal
relationship may exist between the injury the shareholder has suffered and a
breach of the obligations defined in section 1 (b).
III. Voidability
Given the cause of action, the remedy selected by a shareholder may vary
from case to case. However, in any such case the provisions of section 47 (b),"
72 Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), together with Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968), im-
plementing section 10.
73 Compare Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), with Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), as to whether proof of "scienter" is necessary in a pri-
vate action under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The better
view is that neither "scienter" nor any other element of common law fraud should be read
into such an action, since they are not among the elements prescribed in the statute or 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968) (Rule 10b-5) adopted by the SEC. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343
F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965), where the court remarked:
It is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under
the statute and rule. It is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such
as the material misstatement of fact or the omission to state a material fact. Id.
at 379.
Such additional elements are not required when the SEC brings an action to enforce the
provisions of the various securities laws, and there is no apparent reason why the stockholder,
whom the Act was designed to protect, should be put to a stiffer test. See SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), petitions for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1969) (No. 897), 37 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1969) (No. 937), commented on in 44
NoTaE DAME LAWYER 252 (1968).
74 Note that under the voidability provisions of section 47 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46
(1964), the only rights that are declared void are those of persons in violation of the Act.
75 The preferable view is that no causal relationship is required, since the Act prohibits
any business transactions in the absence of registration. Under other securities laws it has been
held that where a firm proscription is alleged, rather than actual or constructive fraud such
as under Rule 10b-5, elements such as reliance or causation need not be shown. Cf. Woodward
v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959).
76 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1964):
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter or of
any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, and every contract heretofore or hereafter
made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this subchapter, or any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any per-
son who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made
or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of
any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right
thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or per-
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the "voidability" section, will be of importance. That section, simply stated,
provides that any contract in violation of the Act or involving the continuance
of any relationship or practice in violation of the Act shall be void with respect
to the rights of the person in violation. Presumably, in selecting his remedy the
person not in violation could elect to preserve his rights under the contract.
In view of the broad proscriptions of sections 1(b) and 7, and in particular
the provisions of section 7 dealing comprehensively with sales activities and
associated conduct of promoters, underwriters and related functionaries," it seems
clear that, in relation to sales transactions, the voidability provisions should be
given literal application for the benefit of any shareholders who claim to have
been injured by a breach of the section 7 requirements. Considering the obvious
intent of Congress to eliminate unregulated investment companies entirely, and
the apparent fact that investors are injured in the same degree by a negligent
disregard of the Act as in those cases where the breach is calculated, the void-
ability provisions should be strictly applied even in the face of contentions by
management that the peculiar circumstances of the case warrant a softening of the
application of section 47 (b). Moreover, because of the special wording of both
section 7 and section 47(b), and the general philosophy of the Act, wholly
executed agreements appear to be within the contemplation of the voidability
provisions. This is contrary to the result which has been reached under related
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
Although the admonition of Professor Loss in relation to the voidability
concept that "there should be an inquiry in each case to decide whether en-
forcement or non-enforcement of the contract would better promote the purposes
of the statute"'7 is valid in relation to Investment Company Act violations in
general, his assertion that
[w]hen a seller has already delivered the securities in violation of §5,s0 or
after a sale which violates §5 or §17(a), the court may be expected to be
somewhat concerned about the general policy ["of preventing people from
getting other people's property for nothing when they purport to be buying
it"] which was so pungently expressed by Justice Holmess'
formance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation,
or order.
77 See notes 67, 68 supra and accompanying text.
78 Inquiry into whether the non-enforcement of contracts will advance the policy of the
laws has led some courts to reject voidability under other securities laws which may be consid-
ered in pari materia. See Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961). Cf. A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp.,
312 U.S. 38 (1941), where a contract merely having a relationship to a public offering was
held not subject to avoidance as being in violation of the provisions of the Securities Act of
1933. But see Kaizer-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 856 (1952), holding a similarly related transaction between an issuer and a broker void
under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964). The
Frost case is distinguishable because (1) it arose under the Securities Act of 1933, which con-
tains no voidability section, and (2) because it did not involve an agreement squarely within
the activities the Act was designed to regulate. See Loss, supra note 48, at 1797-1805.
79 Loss, supra note 48, at 1802.
80 The reference is to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964). The counter-
part of section 5 of the Securities Act (prohibiting sales without registration) in the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 is section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1964). For the text of section 7,
see note 64 supra.
81 Loss, supra note 48, at 1804, citing Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518, 520-21
(1959), quoting from Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voigt & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227,
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is subject to considerable doubt. Here, it would seem, Congress has dearly
declared that where securities are sold in disregard of the registration require-
ments a statutory policy of non-enforcement, even of fully executed contracts, is
in the public interest.
The Investment Company Act is, in its general purport, regulatory in
nature.8 2 The distinction between regulatory measures, affecting the continued
existence of the company and its relationship with its shareholders, and the
concept of disclosure which dominates the other federal securities laws, may
be of profound importance in view of the language of section 47(b). That
section declares that "every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the perform-
ance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or
practice in violation of, [the Act] shall be void . ... s (Emphasis added.)
By reason of the Act's regulatory provisions, the very existence of the unregistered
investment company is a relationship or practice which is proscribed by sections
1 (b) and 7 and, therefore, is subject to avoidance according to the plain mean-
ing of section 47 (b). While it may be argued with considerable logic that the
same result should obtain under a disclosure statute, since the refusal to apply
voidability would amount to an inequitable award to the party in violation of the
statute of the fruits of his wrongdoing, and hence a continuance of a violation
of the law, the case for voidability stands on a stronger footing in the context of
a regulatory system. 4 Therefore, when the issue is presented, the courts will
presumably have little difficulty in reading the provisions of section 47 (b) broadly
enough to affect even fully executed agreements related to sales transactions.85
In fact, the scant authorities under the Act indicate that the courts have
had no difficulty in reading section 47(b) literally. In Brown v. Bullock,8" on
issues presented by way of preliminary motions, the court held that the voidability
provisions could be applied to an investment advisory contract and that the
advisor could be required to repay its management fees for years as to which the
contract had been fully performed. Presumably, the case never actually went to
trial. Provisions of a brokerage agreement entered into by an investment advisor
were held void in Lutz v. Boaz," without specific reference to section 47(b).
Reasoning that the defendants should not be permitted to profit by a void
271 (1909) (dissenting opinion). See also Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 288
F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961), applying the same rationale to an
action under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
82 E.g., Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 217 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961).
83 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1964) (emphasis added). See note 76 supra.
84 Cf. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944),
where the similar voidability provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79z (1964), were held effective to void fully executed contracts. Significantly, the Holding
Company Act is also of a regulatory nature.
85 Cf. Schwartz v. Bowman, 156 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959), where, in a derivative action by a stock-
holder of a railroad company alleging that certain stock sales by the railroad company to an
unregistered investment company were void under section 47 of the Investment Company Act,
the court implicitly recognized the voidability concept in disposing of motions to dismiss.
Since it was subsequently determined that the court lacked jurisdiction as to the cause of
action because of the primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the case is
questionable authority. Commentators have also read the provision broadly. See Garrett,
supra note 12, at 363.
86 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
87 171 A.2d 381 (Del. 1961).
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contract, the court refused to allow the defendants a set-off for the reasonable
value of their services during years in which the unlawful contract had been
fully performed and the registered fund had obtained the benefit of the services. 8
Although one court has held comparable provisions in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934- 9 effective as to executory contracts only,90 it is evident from
the language of section 7 of the Investment Company Act that voidability under
the Act must comprehend fully executed transactions. The provisions of section
7 repeatedly declare that promoters, depositors, trustees, companies or under-
writers shall not "sell, or deliver after sale""' (emphasis added) any securities
issued by an investment company which is not registered. The frequent use of
such terms seems to clearly imply fully executed sales agreements. That is not to
suggest, however, that a court of equity should not condition recovery upon the
plaintiff making restitution of the securities purchased, or similar equitable
arrangements.9 2 But if the securities have been disposed of, principles of restitu-
tion should not deny an aggrieved shareholder his remedy.9
Conclusion
It is the thesis of this article that sections 1 (b) and 7 of the Investment
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the voidability provisions of section
47(b), present a potentially useful tool in the assertion of stockholder rights
by way of a private cause of action. Where a company which fits the definition
of an "investment company" contained in the Act fails to fulfill the requirements
of either section 1 (b) or 7, counsel for management should be alert to require
prompt corrective measures. In similar circumstances, those advising stockholders
whose investments have gone sour might find these provisions most useful if the
violations of the Act are in connection with investors' loss.
As a vehicle for shareholder action, these provisions of the Investment
Company Act appear to present a clear alternative to action under the more
familiar anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 19334 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,9" and an alternative which might profitably be asserted in
conjunction with such a fraud claim. Moreover, an action under the Investment
Company Act may be preferable to an action under the anti-fraud provisions
because of the apparent lack of the necessity to prove any of the elements of com-
88 The investment advisor was, however, permitted to claim actual expenses incurred as
a set-off. Id. at 391.
89 The language of section 7 may be compared with sections 3(a) (14), 5, 9 and 10 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a) (14), 78e, 78i and 78j (1964),
all of which are at least ambiguous as to whether they contemplate fully executed transactions.
There is no apparent reason why they should not reach such agreements, however, at least
where the relief sought is consistent with the purpose of the statute. The only case which
casts doubt on this proposition is Bankers Life and Gas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961).
90 Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784, 787 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961). See also note 78 supra.
91 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7(a)(1), '(b)(1), (c), (d) (1964), all of which employ the
language quoted.
92 See Loss, supra note 48, at 1804.
93 Cf. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION J§ 65, 151, 201, 215 (1937).
94 15 U.S.C. § 77q '(1964).
95 Id. § 78j and Rule l0b-5 adopted pursuant thereto, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
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mon law fraud which have frequently been read into actions under other secu-
rities laws.
These concepts were first brought into sharp focus and given effect in the
1968 Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decision of Esplin v. Hirschi "
Although the court only addressed itself briefly to the Investment Company Act,
it did so in a manner that dearly indicated its intention to adopt the position that
a private action may be based upon section 7 and the voidability provisions of
the Act:
This court, therefore, finds that although the Investment Company Act
makes no specific provision for private civil liability arising from the viola-
tions of the Act such liability may be implied.
The court below in its conclusions of law found that B & E was at all
times after July 1, 1961, an unlicensed investment company within the
definition, meaning and intent of the Act. Hence, the cause of action
against B & B should have been sustained[97l and the requested rescission of
the security purchase arrangement allowed. This conforms with the pro-
visions of the Act declaring any contracts made by an investment company
in violation of the Act (including the sale of unregistered securities) to be
void. 8
Thus the voidability section was given literal effect, and in this case applied to
a fully executed, verbal agreement.
In another connection, while disposing of the question whether the case
should be maintained as a class action under the provisions of amended Rule 23,"
the Hirschi court examined the elements of such an action and squarely adopted
the simplified formula advanced herein which the Act seems to require:
Inasmuch as plaintiffs were merely required to show that B & E was an
investment company, that it had not registered and that the individual de-
fendants were controlling persons, the activities of the plaintiffs could have
little or no effect upon the operative facts determining liability. Hence, while
the propriety of allowing a class action on the lb-5 count is an extremely
close question, there is really little doubt, as to the Investment Company
Act, that the common issues predominate. 100
Significantly, each of these propositions (except as to the Rule 23 class action)
96 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. April 1, 1969)
(No. 1013).
97 The trial court did not grant relief under the Investment Company Act claim because
of its conclusion that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The
appellate court differed with that conclusion and held that "[i]n any event, the federal law
clearly requires that in every limitation question the old chancery doctrine of equitable tolling
is to be applied" and that after applying the tolling doctrine the claim was within the
applicable limitation period. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
37 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. April 1, 1969) (No. 1013).
98 Id. at 103-04.
99 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
100 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3369
(U.S. April 1, 1969) (No. 1013).
[June, 1969]
[Vol. 44:699] NEGLECTED ALTERNATIVES FOR INVESTOR SELF-HELP 717
was also recognized in the trial court,'01 and apparently is no longer disputed
even by the defendants.
1 2
Thus, while Hirschi may constitute an important precedent with respect to
the liabilities of companies and their management which either intentionally or
negligently fail to adhere to the standards imposed by the Act, it is evident that
to effectively test the limits of these concepts further case development will be
desirable. Such development is long overdue. Hopefully, the practicing bar
will pay greater attention to this type of private action. The clear invitation of
Congress for investors in unregistered investment companies to avail themselves
of self-help, by way of a private civil action, and to require compliance with the
regulatory scheme is certainly an alternative which merits more attention than it
has received in the twenty-nine years since the Act was adopted.
101 Hirschi v. B & E Securities, Inc., Civil No. C 243-65 (D. Utah, Aug., 1966). The
trial court found, based upon the single determination of the jury that "B & E Securities, Inc.,
engaged or proposed to engage primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading
in securities at any time from its organization through the time of the sale of stock to
plaintiffs," that "B & E Securities, Inc., was . . . an unlicensed 'investment company' within
the definition, meaning and intent of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ... ." Accord-
ingly, it declined to require a showing of causation, reliance or any other elements frequently
required in actions under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.
102 The defendants in Hirschi apparently now concede that liability may be properly
invoked under the Investment Company Act. In their petition for certiorari filed with the
Uinited States Supreme Court they assert:
The court of appeals ruled that the proper statute had been applied to your
petitioners and sustained the dismissal of the Investment Company claim as to them,
but held that B & E was liable under the Investment Company Act because a different
limitations statute was applicable to it. This ruling is not questioned by this Petition.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 18-19, Esplin v. Hirschi, Docket No. 1013, Supreme
Court of the United States, Jan., 1969.
